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TREATING TRIBES AS STATES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT:
THE GOOD AND THE BAD*
MR. MONETTE:l Good morning. Nice to see you all again. We
have a slight change in the panel, as you can see. Let me just first
mention that John Harbison has, I understand, taken ill and probably
won't be with us today. So he could probably use some of our good
thoughts. And Sam Deloria will sit in in his place to help respond.
Our topic is, as you can see, Treating Tribes as States Under the
Clean Water Act: The Good and the Bad. A whole host of environmental statutes have done this sort of thing in recent years, extendingCongress extending to the agencies the authority to deal with the tribes
as states. It raises a lot of peculiar questions, and, if I can, I'll give the
speaker a little time to think about it. Let me set up some ground work
the way I look at it. And I guess if I looked at it quite the exact same
way that the speakers did, I maybe wouldn't do this, but I don't look at
it exactly the same way. So I'll give you some of my perspectives;
they'll give you theirs.
Let me just give a real simple background in civics that we all had in
sixth grade. We all remember the states becoming states and we all
remember them wanting to form a union and the people wanting to form
a union and all the bickering and battling that went back and forth. But
a couple of the themes running through there are still alive and well in
the Constitution and are still with us today. And I think it's worthy for
us to know both of those themes, both of these sort of traditions of
thought that come down to America today. We have a tendency to think,
you know, us versus them when it's the tribal people, us versus the
United States, or us versus the states. When we do that, we have a
tendency to think that perhaps the United States or all the states think
alike, and they don't. We know, of course, that they have vast differences in thought and ideology from, for example, someone like Chief
Justice Rehnquist to someone like Former Vice President Walter
Mondale, vastly different political theory coming from these sorts of
people.
And early on, some of the quotes that I find important and hang
with me, one is by the colonial governor of Massachusetts. He said that
* The following are edited proceedings from the North Dakota Law Review Symposium
Conference. Held at the University of North Dakota on April 21, 1995, this panel discussion was
premised on James Grijalva's article entitled Tribal GovernmentalRegulation of Non-Indian Polluters
of Reservation Waters, 71 N.D. L. REv. 483 (1995), and John Harbison's article entitled The
Downstream People: Treating Indian Tribes as States under the Clean Water Act, 71 N.D. L. REv. 473
(1995).
I. Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin where he teaches Indian Law,
Water Rights, and Torts.
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two legislatures, two law-making bodies, two legal systems cannot exist in
the same jurisdiction. Simply can't happen, he said. And he was, of
course, being opposed to the formation of the union. He was opposed to
the idea that Massachusetts might give up some sovereignty. Massachusetts, as you know, at that point was a very powerful entity in this
budding country. In fact, around the world quite often when people
were coming to the United States and trading, doing commerce, et cetera,
they didn't even talk about the United States. They didn't talk about
any particular state, Virginia, Massachusetts.
Quite often it was "We're taking goods to Boston." Boston was the
place to be. Massachusetts was quite likely going to be a very powerful
country in its own right, had the history developed that way. And the
Governor felt very strongly in those terms. Now, another quote that I
like to use to shed a little light on it, so to speak, was by the minority of
the convention in Pennsylvania where one of them said, "We apprehend
that two coordinate sovereigns would be a solecisim in politics." I don't
know what that means either. But I think it means something like what
the governor of Massachusetts was saying. If you have two law-making
bodies, they came down to one inevitable conclusion, conflicts are going
to arise between them and we have to find a way to work them out.
That's inevitable. And they were going to create a union and they
wanted it to work. Just to make a long story short, we know what
happened, right? We had people like James Madison and others saying,
"Well, one of them is going to have to be supreme, but only one can be
supreme." Well, if one's supreme, it's going to swallow up the others.
Well, then we'll make the others a little bit broader and extend their
power beyond the supremacy so that where they act outside the
supremacy, they're going to have power. That way we'll strike a
balance between the two. We'll make sure this one doesn't swallow up
these and make sure these don't swallow up this one. And we know that
that logic came to be embodied in the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution. Right? What is not granted by these states and the people
in the Constitution to the union shall be reserved to the states or to the
people. All of that embodied the logic of Democracy coming from the
people through their states to this union but that they would have the vast
inherent sovereignty that was not given to the union. They would be the
source of it, they would be the custodians of it, and they would retain it.
Now, however it happened-and there's room for debate here-but
however it happened, the tribes' sovereign spheres came to overlap with
the United States. So, however through treaties, through conquest,
through force, however it happened, day in and day out tribes are
dealing with Indian Gaming Acts, Indian Civil Rights Acts, Indian Child
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Welfare Acts, their sovereign spheres are overlapping with the U.S., and
that's reality. Now one of the ways it happened is the most ideal way,
and I would like to see that way developed in the law personally, is by
treaties. And I'll tell you the reason I'd like to see it developed that way,
because one of the first treaties that the Supreme Court construed, the
Supreme Court wrote, basically, treaties are to be construed as a grant of
rights from the Indians, not to them, and the reservation of those not
granted. That's in a case called United States v. Winans.2 In other
words, it used logic and wording remarkably similar to the logic and
wording that was put into the Tenth Amendment to guide the relationship between the union and the states.
The source of the sovereignty issue will be guided by democracy.
It will come from the local people, and where the sovereign sphere
overlaps by treaties, it will come from the tribes and their people. Just
the niceties of Democracy being applied in both relationships. And it's
played itself out often, even though we haven't really discussed it this
way I think and we haven't always studied it this way and attorneys
haven't always argued it that way, and the Court hasn't always explained
it this way. But, for example, there's a case out there, one of the early
cases, called Barron v. Baltimore where the Court held that the Bill of
Rights didn't apply to the states. Why not? "They have their own
source of sovereignty," the Court said. "If their citizens don't want
their states to be infringing on their civil rights, they can use their own
states and their own Constitutions. They don't need the Federal Bill of
Rights to do that." Well, there's a case called Talton v. Mayes 3 where
the question was whether the Federal Bill of Rights bound the Cherokee
Nation, and the Court said almost exactly the same thing using almost
exactly the same language. The Cherokee Nation has its own source of
sovereignty and its own participatory process. If the Cherokee Nation
and Cherokee people don't want the tribe infringing on their rights, they
can do it in their own Constitution. They don't need the Bill of Rights
to do that.
Let me give you one more example. There is a case called United
States v. Lanza, one of the seminal cases in the area, where, out of the
same set of facts, the federal government and the state were going to
prosecute a crime. Of course, the defendant raised a double jeopardy
claim. The Court just simply held "We have two sovereigns here. Their
spheres do overlap but they also have separate interests that each of them
can vindicate to take care of themselves." Well, we also have a case
2. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
3. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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called United States v. Wheeler4 where the United States and the Navajo
Nation both attempted to prosecute a crime arising out of the same set of
facts, the same person. He raised double jeopardy in his defense. The
Court again said almost exactly the same thing. I mean, the wording is
remarkably the same. We have here two separate sovereigns, each with
its own source of sovereignty. So, I guess one of the lines of thinking
here gets to the point of, well, we're sort of treating tribes as states.
Some people appreciate that. Some people don't. I'm not necessarily
saying that tribes are states, should be states, want to be states, but what I
am saying is this: That in order to enjoy and cultivate that difference
between those sovereigns that Professor Laurence was talking about
yesterday, along that line where their sovereign spheres overlap, this
country has a well-developed logic steeped in democracy to ensure that
those states continue to function. My question is, how often have we
developed, can we develop, do these papers develop, do these laws
attempt to develop that idea for tribes? Where the sovereign spheres of
the tribes and the United States overlap, can we take that logic and apply
it here using democratic principles to ensure that the tribes survive? Just
simple democracy. So, I think some of that is at play, although I think
that our papers don't necessarily look at it that way. We'll have some
time to respond after Jim gives us a somewhat different rendition but
from a very well-thought-out perspective. So the first speaker is James
Grijalva. He's a graduate of Lewis and Clark College of Law, as most of
you know is sort of the preeminent environmental law institution, with
your school, of course, Bruce. Jim is now at the University of North
Dakota teaching Indian law and environmental law and other subjects as
an Assistant Professor. So let me give you James Grijalva.
PRESENTATION BY

JAMEs GRJALVA

Tribal Governmental Regulation of Non-Indian Polluters of
Reservation Waters. Omitted.
PRESENTATION BY REBECCA

TsosIE's

OF JOHN HARBISON'S PAPER

The Downstream People: Treating Indian Tribes as States
under the Clean Water Act. Omitted.
MR. MONETTE: I was in Albuquerque a couple weeks ago and I
walked downtown into a gallery that a non-Indian owned and was

4. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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working at, full of beautiful Indian artwork and jewelry and he was
doing well. He was really, you know, making a mint off selling this
stuff. And so I thought I'd, you know, just have a few discussions with
him. And I asked him what he thought about the Isleta thing and he
went off. He was paying, you know, as much as twelve dollars a month
more for water and he was being taken to the cleaners by these darned
Indians. I thought, you're certainly being taken to the cleaners by
somebody, but I don't think you're sending that money to the tribes. In
the meantime he's probably sold an extra piece of jewelry a month just
to make up for that.
Our panelist is going to be Professor Judith Royster. You all met
her yesterday so I won't go on lengthily about her, but perhaps the most
prominent thing in her life, that I don't think was aired as well as it
might have been yesterday, she's a stellar graduate from the University
of Wisconsin where I now teach. She graduated before I got there but
we all know that the alumni are the most important people around. So
Professor Judith Royster.
MS. ROYSTER: The basic thing that I want to talk about,
unfortunately, is what Professor Grijalva referred to earlier as that
depressing stuff. I'd like to return to the issue that came up at the
second afternoon session yesterday and talk about what I think is a kind
of fundamental cognitive dissonance between the way we deal with the
environmental protection statutes in Indian country, and Brendale5 and
the way that we deal with zoning in Indian country. In particular, I want
to make the point that land use planning is a first-line environmental
defense and that the Supreme Court has removed from tribes much of
their ability to engage in that first-line environmental defense, has left
tribes with, I don't know, 85, 90 percent of environmental protection
under the statutes. But that's not 100 percent.
Brendale, which is discussed in Professor Grijalva's paper but which
he didn't have an opportunity to present, was the follow-up case to
Montana6 and it dealt with zoning and the ability of the Yakima Nation
in Washington State to zone on its reservation. Zoning or land use
planning-I prefer to talk about the concept of comprehensive land use
planning rather than zoning. I think that it makes the point a little
better. The Court found that the Yakima territory was divided up into an
open area and a closed area, according to whether a given area of the
reservation was "Indian" enough. And it was Justice Stevens, joined by

5. Brendale v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989).
6. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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Justice O'Connor, who made that distinction and who didn't give us
much of an explanation as to exactly when a reservation or a part of a
reservation is sufficiently Indian that we can call it closed. That depends
on land use patterns, on land tenure, on population, on the presence of
towns, any or all of the above; he wasn't clear. There was no majority
opinion in Brendale. There was a 4, 2, 3 split, but the bottom line was
that when a reservation or an area of a reservation is closed, is sufficiently "Indian," whatever that might mean, the tribe retains full land use
planning authority throughout the entirety of that reservation or that
area regardless of ownership-regardless of title to any particular parcel
of land. Where a reservation or a part of a reservation is open, is not
sufficiently "Indian," of sufficiently Indian character, whatever that
might mean, the Court said that primary land use planning authority
rests with the state. The tribe retains authority on non-Indian fee lands,
on trust lands, and the Court bypassed the issue of what to do about
Indian-owned fee lands. But on non-Indian fee lands the county has
primary zoning authority and what's left for the tribe is the ability to
challenge that on a use-by-use, parcel-by-parcel basis under the
Montana direct effects test. The tribe apparently has the ability to go
before the county zoning board (the Court was vague on the precise
procedures) and argue that a particular land use designation or a
particular land use proposal on non-Indian fee land within its territory
has enough of a direct effect on tribal interests, on tribal health and
welfare, that the tribe should have control over that parcel, or at least that
the county's proposed zoning use or zoning designation is inappropriate.
What the Court declined to do, and what the dissent argued
strenuously that the Court should have done, was not to address the issue
of zoning on a discrete parcel-by-parcel basis but to look at the fact that
the tribe was asserting its power of land use planning, comprehensive
land use planning, which, if done right, is what zoning is all about. And
that comprehensive land use planning, or the ability to engage in
comprehensive land use planning, is something which under any set of
circumstances has a direct and substantial impact on tribal interests, on
tribal health and welfare. The Court declined to address it in that global
context and brought it down to the specifics. In Brendale itself, the
proposed use in the open area was to subdivide a 32-acre tract into 20
single family lots. And when you take it down to that discrete level, it's
much more difficult for a tribe to argue that that has a substantial and
direct impact on tribal health and welfare than it is to argue that the
ability to comprehensively, plan for land use has a substantial impact on
tribal health and welfare.
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What the Court did in Brendale, then, was to remove from tribes, or
at least tribes with open reservations or open areas of reservations, the
ability to engage in comprehensive land use planning. It maybe left
them with sort of bits and pieces of zoning authority in an attempt to at
least address particular parcels or particular proposed uses, but took
from them that ability to zone generally, to engage in the comprehensive
nature of determining what uses ought to be made where within the
territory. That seems to me to remove from those tribes the ability to
engage in that first-line environmental defense.
Professor Grijalva argues in his paper that there is a difference, and
I think I understand why he made this argument and I would make this
argument, too, as an advocate, 7 although I fundamentally don't agree
with it. The argument is that there's a difference between environmental
or water quality planning and zoning in that zoning has discrete and
localized impacts, whereas water pollution has migratory and widespread impacts. And on one level I think that that's very true. But on
another level it's not.
Where government has the ability to engage in comprehensive land
use planning it can create green-belt zoning. It can create riparian zones
in which development is restricted or prohibited. It can control uses near
waterways. Let me take it specifically to water rather than trying to go
into other environmental media. It can create zones to control nonpoint
source pollution: that is, runoff, agricultural runoff, construction runoff,
residential runoff, which is not dealt with well by the Clean Water Act, if
it's dealt with by the Clean Water Act at all. In that sense it seems to me
that the ability to engage in that kind of land use planning is central to a
tribe's ability to control the environment or to regulate the environment.
And the Supreme Court has bypassed that issue and said that for most
tribes, at least in part, that ability to engage in the fundamental first-line
comprehensive land use planning is not there.
Contrasted to that, we have the federal environmental statutes, and in
particular here we're talking about the Clean Water Act.. The EPA is not
willing to come right out and say that tribes have authority over the
entire territory of the reservations, but the EPA wanders its way around
and ends up close to that. The EPA says basically that most tribes
should in all instances have the authority to regulate the waters
throughout the territorial boundaries of the reservation because it finds
under Montana/Brendalethat Congress has said that water pollution has
such substantial and direct impacts on tribal health and welfare that this
7. See Judith V. Royster, Environmental Protection and Native American Rights: Controlling
Land Use Through Environmental Regulation, 1 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 89 (1991).
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is necessarily something over which tribes retain authority on non-Indian
fee lands as well as on trust lands. 8 I think the EPA's interpretation is
much too tentative and not sufficiently categorical, but I agree with
where the EPA ultimately ends up.
The problem that I see is this kind of dissonance: that we
understand that water pollution is something which has impacts on health
and welfare issues, and that therefore under Montana/Brendale,water
pollutants are something which tribes ought to have the authority to
regulate within the territorial boundaries of the Indian country. But the
Supreme Court over here is saying, "That's not true of land use
planning." And it seems to me that the two form an integrated whole.
I don't have an answer to this. I suppose the old-fashioned answer
is: wouldn't it be nice if Congress fixed it. Wouldn't it be nice if
Congress recognized that Brendale was really a seriously bad decision
and overturned Brendale in the way that it dealt with Duro.9 Congress
certainly has the ability to do that. Congress has done it on rare
occasions when the Supreme Court has gone one step too far.
Unfortunately, Congress did not believe that Brendale had gone one step
too far. And it seems to me to leave tribes in an anomolous position:
that they can control through the water quality standards program and
other programs under various of the environmental acts the pollution of
the waters. What they cannot do in many instances is decide what the use
of the land is going to be in the first place. And it seems to me that any
sort of integrated theory of environmental protection by tribes in Indian
country should accord tribes necessarily the ability to engage in the full
range of environmental protection programs. Thank you.
MR. MONETTE: You know, this question about the non-Indian
land on the reservation and allotments and all these rights that I still hear
running through all this stuff seems not to get squarely addressed. I do
believe that non-Indians who live on the reservation have great equities
to consider, property rights and other such things. I don't think it has to
be all quite that difficult. Did you ever see the first episode of Little
House on the Prairie? If you remember it, Charles went out there and
built a cabin out on this land. And he then got a letter in the mail a few
days later, a month later or something. And he got kind of teary-eyed
the way only Charles could do. And he just said, you know, "Well, the
federal government says we can't live here." That's all he said. And so
then the whole episode was about tearing down the house and moving it,
rebuilding it and all, and it was rather dramatic. But they never told what
8. See 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876 (1991).
9. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1991), "fixed" by 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2).
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the letter said. So I went to Little House on the Prairie archives and got a
hold of a copy. Here's what it said. "Dear Mr. Ingalls, the federal
government has been informed that you and your family have settled
upon land in contravention of federal law. The U.S.A. has not yet
acquired the territory on which your parcel sits. As Chief Justice John
Marshall has said, Indian territory may be acquired by purchase or
conquest. And since the territory is yet to be purchased, we fear that
Laura's writings may give the tribe the indication that we think we have
conquered them, which we have not. And, as you know, President
Thomas Jefferson once said, 'I view this discovery right merely as a right
of preemption, but until it is exercised, our right is subject to the tribe's
use and occupancy, and that may be forever."' The letter then quoted
John Marshall's cases, saying, "You can, however, live there, Charles, but
you take the property subject to the laws and the title and all the
regulation of the Indian tribe. And if you don't want to do that, then
don't move there and don't live there until we acquire it. Signed the
Federal Government." Seems to be a pretty simple answer you think?
Our next speaker is going to be Professor Rebecca Tsosie, who is at
the Arizona State University College of Law. She has clerked for the
Arizona Supreme Court and worked with Brown & Bain in Phoenix and
has a keen interest in Indian law.
MS. TSOSIE:10 I want to raise a couple of points in response to
Professor Harbison's paper, and then I will, of course, reserve enough
time for Sam Deloria's comments. I think that we need to look closely
at the two main premises of this paper. 1I First of all, that integrated
watershed management is a goal that we should all aspire to; and, second
of all, that we know integrated watershed management is a goal we all
should aspire to because we know that it's economically efficient. And
my starting position to thinking about these issues, I will admit, is one of
suspicion. I'm always suspicious of a theory that is not generated from
within but has been transposed onto tribal environmental policy. And so
my own goal is always to figure out from a tribal perspective, do these
10. Rebecca Tsosie, Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University; J.D., UCLA 1990.
My thanks and appreciation to the North Dakota Law Review for the opportunity to participate in the
symposium. This text reflects oral comments I made at the symposium. In preparing to make these
comments, I relied on the following sources: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Watershed
Protection Approach: An Overview, (Dec. 1991); William Goldfarb, Watershed Management:
Slogan or Solution, 21 B.C. ENVT'L AFi. L. REV. 483 (1994); Jeffrie G. Murphy, The Justice of
Economics, in JEFFRmG. MURPHY, RErRmUTnoN RECONSIDERED: MoRE EssAys INTHE P HnosPHY OF LAW
(1992).
11. These comments are offered is response to Professor Harbison's excellent and insightful
article, The Downstream People: Treating Tribes as States Under the Clean Water Act, 71 N.D. LAW
REV. 523 (1995). Because Professor Harbison could not be present at the symposium to deliver his
own paper, I have taken the liberty of interpreting the paper as I understood it. I apologize for any
errors in this interpretation.
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things make sense? What is the impact? And how do we understand
those things? Federal environmental legislation provides a threshold or
baseline way to measure environmental quality nationwide, however it
also transposes Euro-American values and norms on the American
Indian nations. One of Professor Harbison's positions on the Clean
Water Act is that tribes should use the leverage that they can acquire
from being treated as states under the Clean Water Act to foster a
watershed approach to water quality protection.
So, I want to ask, does this make sense in terms of tribal environmental policy or are we just using the tribes as a means to an end that is
for the greater national good? For example, tribal lands were used in the
federal dam projects of the 1930s, '40s, and '50s for the greater public
good, although that had devastating effects on the tribes.
Now, my first question when I look at the whole issue of integrated
watershed management is, "what is a watershed?" And I was hoping
that there was an easy answer to that. People toss the concept of
"watershed" around and they say, well, it applies to all surface waters,
and that sounds nice and friendly. But then I looked in the EPA manual
that deals with a watershed concept. And they define watershed, first, as
"a drainage basin of a receiving water body," which makes sense; "a
geographic area in which water, sediments, and dissolved materials drain
to a common outlet; a point on a larger stream, a lake, an underlying
aquifer, an estuary, or ocean." In other words, therefore, groundwater
can be a receiving water body for purposes of the watershed, which is a
little more complicated than the first definition. But then the EPA goes
on to say, that the Watershed Protection Approach does not even require
a particular definition of watershed, rather, and I'm quoting from the
EPA manual, "local decisions on the scale of a geographic unit consider
many factors, including the ecological structure of the basin, the
hydrologic factors of underlying groundwaters, the economic uses, the
type and scope of pollution problems, and the level of resources
available for protection and restoration projects." So the watershed
concept includes several socioeconomic concepts. And that means to me
that it is not a value neutral scientific concept. It is a concept that is
loaded with values and norms from the majority culture.
Now I think that that fact that it is not a value neutral concept is
borne out in the history, and I won't bore you with the long history of
this. But suffice it to say that this concept of watershed management has
very long historical roots in the concept of unified river basin management that's been around since the turn of the century and was, in fact,
responsible for the dam projects. And the hydroelectric dam projects
I'm speaking of were driven by this idea of regional socioeconomic
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development and publicly-owned hydropower. However, the effects of
those projects on tribes, for example, on the Northwest Coast, were
devastating on traditional ways of life. I'm thinking of Celilo Falls
being flooded, these places. I mean, there is no way to describe the
impact on the tribal people up there. Therefore, although the dams were
to promote a greater public good, I think that we have to acknowledge
that the Indian nations in many cases were sacrificed for that.
And the concept of unified river basin management persists. In
1965 Congress passed a Water Resources Planning Act. This established
a federal intra-agency water resources council that was supposed to
accomplish localized consensus building about watershed problems and
come up with proposed solutions. Of course the Act failed to achieve
this in part because it was very difficult to reach consensus, particularly
about who should bear the economic cost of the proposed solutions.
Nonetheless, the concept persists and is embodied in the EPA's proposal
of watershed management that I referred to earlier. Notably, the concept
of watershed management is encompassed within the terms of the Clean
Water Act as it is now drafted. For example, the EPA Act uses the phrase
"watershed management" with reference to programs such as wasteload
allocations for point sources, also elements of the point source
stormwater management program, such as watershed-wide permitting,
and also supervision of state nonpoint source control programs under
section 319. So we do have the concept already embodied in the legal
structure. Now the EPA proposal really deals with a bottom-up process,
consensus building, not a top-down regulatory enforcement process.
And there's a big difference between those two approaches. I was a little
bit confused from Professor Harbison's paper as to which method he's
advocating. I believe that he is probably advocating the voluntary
consensus driven approach, but in some places he almost indicates a
more regulatory top-down approach. So that's one question I would
have for him that I don't have any clear answers for at this point.
Now the EPA proposal has three main elements, risk-based targeting
of focused watersheds, participation by all affected and interested
stakeholders, and integrated solutions established by stakeholder
consensus. And I think that Professor Harbison includes many of those
things in his own proposal. Now this raises some problems in terms of
alternative dispute resolution theory that I think that we can't lose sight
of. First of all, how do we get the parties to the negotiating table? Of
course, volumes of literature exist on this, but usually parties don't
negotiate very effectively unless they believe that they really can't
achieve everything that they want, complete victory, if you will, through
the courts or the political process. Second of all, parties will not
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generally negotiate matters of principle. So if you have a clear value
conflict, that is going to be very difficult to bring successfully to the
negotiating table. And, finally, we need to have equal knowledge and
data and resources on both sides.
Next, I want to look at whether economic analysis is a useful way or
the only way to think about this concept of watershed management.
And that requires me to think about whether economic analysis is a
useful concept for Indian nations to apply to their own policies.
Professor Harbison mentions, 12 I think tongue in cheek, that maybe
Native Americans are not "members of the species homo economicus,"
that they may be "paradigm-busting altruists whose sole concern is the
public welfare, though I doubt it." And he goes on to say that "It is not
for nothing that economics is called the dismal science." I question
whether we need to buy into the values that are encompassed in
economic theory, although I admit do think that it's often a useful way
to think about issues, and what the benefits of a given course of action
will be. And it seems to me that what emerges out of the Clean Water
Act is the question, "who should pay for the negative impacts of growth
and development?" It seems to me that in the Clean Water Act we
impose those costs on the polluter who's actually benefitting from the
pollution. He or she has to pay to bring his or her operation into
compliance with the permit requirements. And, again, economic analysis
is really implicit in the Clean Water Act, for example, determining
appropriate technology to be used to control pollution, or how clean can
we make water and still have it be feasible. And, of course, tribes are also
held to those norms.
Now, why should we shift the cost from the polluter to the
downstream user? And that seems to me the main problem with what
Professor Harbison is suggesting; that in order to get an economically
efficient result, in some cases we will have to pass the cost down to, for
example, Isleta. It seems to me that the downstream users are already
disproportionately impacted just by virtue of their position in the natural
order of things. And do we want to make the downstream users bear
more of the costs of compliance? As long as economic analysis is built
into the standards in the first place, why do we have to look at it again?
And also, can we really quantify the types of costs that we're talking
about in the cost-benefit equation? Professor Harbison talks about
marginal social damages. What are marginal social damages? Professor
Harbison claims that the optimal level of pollution in each jurisdiction is
12. Throughout this commentary, Professor Tsosie's references are to an earlier draft of
Professor Harbison's paper.

19951

ENVIRoNMENT PANEL DISCUSSION

509

the point where the marginal social damages of waste equal the marginal
social costs of abatement. What is a marginal social damage? I think it's
fairly easy to quantify economic loss to an industry, for example, the
cost of compliance and loss of jobs if the industry can't make it. But
what are marginal social damages? Are we talking about health costs?
Increased risk of cancer? Birth defects? Deformities? Contamination of
fish or wildlife? I mean, what is it exactly we're talking about and do we
want to quantify that? Is there an "optimal" level of pollution? Can we
say that for a certainty? I mean, should we say that a dollar's worth of
prevention must buy us a dollar's worth of environmental quality and
establish that standard across the board? My mind actually resists that. I
mean, why shouldn't there be a right to environmental quality? And,
I'm not sure that wealth maximization is the goal that we should all
advocate.13 Many Indian people have other very valid ways of looking
at the environment and their relationship to the environment. And I'm
not talking about romanticized notions. I'm talking about a relationship
that goes back to the beginning of time for them, in their minds.
So I guess I should conclude by saying that beyond all of this, we
need to look at the impact on tribal sovereignty. And when you throw
all of this into a negotiating process, a political process, it chums through
many segments of society, private interest groups, cities, states; I don't
know that the tribes aren't going to get lost in that. Right now we have a
fairly distinct relationship. We have tribes on an equal playing field with
states in many respects, and so we have a power relation that looks much
different than if we throw all those different interests into some big
political tumbler and let them get sorted out by applying concepts of
economics and watershed consensus building and scientific value. And
so that's basically what I want to say. I want to reserve time for Sam
Deloria to give us his take on all this. So thank you all.
MR. HARBISON (written comments provided after the symposium):
My response to Rebecca Tsosie's comments will be brief. With most of
what she says, I completely agree. I agree, for example, that watershed
projects that have focused on development, such as the Oahu Dam and
Reservoir in the Bourland case, have done substantial harm to tribal
interests. Professor Tsosie is right to caution tribes concerning the
13. Needless to say, economic analysis is premised on a normative theory that maintains that the
principle of wealth maximization ought to guide adjudication and policy-making decisions. As
Professor Murphy notes in his excellent criticism of economic analysis, the principle of wealth
maximization appears to lack any ethical value in its own right. See Murphy, supra note 10. It is
certainly not "intrinsically valuable," as is, for example, a human life, nor is there any compelling
argument that it has an instrumental value that does not depend upon controversial ethical assumptions.
Rather, the ethical nature and value of wealth maximization seems to be "totally derivative from
whatever ethical priniples it assists in fulfilling." Id. at 89.
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potential ramifications of watershed management. I also agree that
watershed pollution management may involve high transaction costs,
depending on factors like the size of the watershed and the number of
stakeholders.
Most importantly, I agree that polluters should pay. In a wellfunctioning regulatory system, polluters pay through the expenditures
necessitated by pollution standards. In my paper, I merely argue that the
watershed is the appropriate locus for deciding what these standards
should be, and consequently what the compliance costs will be. If
watershed stakeholders decide that every last particle of pollution is to be
removed from effluent and runoff streams, no matter how high the cost,
the outcome reflects the local demand for clean water. In such a case,
presumably, the benefits of absolutely clean water, some of which may
be hard to quantify, equal the costs. I predict that this case would be
unlikely to occur, of course, in the real world. Indeed, I predict that it
would be unlikely to occur even in a tribal world where, as Professor
Tsosie suggests, Indians have a relationship with the earth that entails
long-term stewardship rather than an instant cost/benefit balance sheet.
Theoretically, however, it is not an outcome contradicted by marginal
economics.
Professor Tsosie asks whether we should look at the problem of
water pollution through the lens of marginal economics. To this I can
only say, how can we not, as long as we live in a world of scarcity and
constraint.
Finally, I want to make it clear that my paper does not disavow the
traditional tools of pollution regulation, neither water quality-based nor
technology-based standards. Even a consensus-driven approach to
regulatory standards must employ enforceable rules to achieve
agreed-upon goals. There is no choice between a bottom-up, consensus
building process to determine the goals and a top-down, enforcement
process to achieve them. Both are required.
MR. DELORIA: I wonder if they figure in the cost of conferences
to talk about stuff, with the costs of environmental regulation or costany kind of economic cost. Figure the cost of conferences, it would
make everything prohibitive and we could close government down. I
want to start with a couple of images to try to conjure in your minds as I
make some remarks about this topic today. First is one that those of you
who are on the circuit with me will have heard before, but some of these
folks are newcomers so I'll say it again. I kind of developed this in
response to the hassling the tribes were getting over fishing rights. And
that was the image of a boarding house. They used to have things like
boarding houses where single working men lived and they had a
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common place to eat. And in this boarding house there was one Indian
living there and he was sitting at the end of the table and at the other end
of the table was a huge platter of pork chops and they started serving
themselves and the platter of pork chops worked its way down to the
Indian's end of the table. When it got to him, there was one little bitty,
dried-up, pitiful pork chop left. And so what was he going to do? He
took it. And all eyes turned down towards him and somebody said,
"That damn Indian ate up all the pork chops," which at that time was
my way of characterizing the arguments about the effect of Indian
fishing on the fishing resource. But it seems to me that anybody that
suggests that Indians sitting at the table on watershed management are
going to screw up an otherwise orderly system suggests to me that that
last regulatory pork chop is jeopardized.
I think one of the problems we have in this business is that we
sometimes fail to appreciate the limitations of metaphor or analogy.
Clearly there are senses in which you have to think of things in terms of
watersheds. And, clearly, there comes a time when a process gets too
complicated and too cumbersome. None of those observations really
answers anything for us when we talk about what, if any, is going to be
the role of Indian tribes in the regulatory system. They're both true
observations but not particularly helpful. I think one of the things that
we need to do more of and some of the things that I was trying to say
yesterday about the conflict of interest problem is we have to look at a
total decision-making system which I define as a structure with a process.
And we have to see how power is allocated in that system, what its
architecture is and where decisions are made and who makes those
decisions and what it costs you in terms of power to be at a certain place
in the system, what you give up in order to do that.
If we look at, for example, different theories of protecting water
quality, you see that certain decisions are going to be made by legislative
bodies, certain decisions are going to be made by courts, certain
decisions are going to be made by technocrats. I think the strategy for
Indian tribes has to be to have plans ready to participate at every stage in
the process, to have an argument ready to maximize your power at any
stage in the process, not necessarily because you have to exercise that
power, but because that's all you've got to trade, which is precisely
what's going on in the gaming situation is tribes have to continue the
metaphor of a particular pile of chips in this area and they've got to
spend them carefully as they deal with state governments. So, the
notion-and I'm responding to the idea, not so much to Mr. Harbison's
paper because he's not here to present it or defend it-that somehow an
otherwise orderly governmental system is going to be wrecked if Indians
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take that last pork chop of power. And I think that it may be complicated and it may create some problems but it's not a real argument against
it.
The other image I want to leave with you is how to characterize
Supreme Court jurisprudence of the last couple years on the subject of
Indian affairs. And, you know, I was thinking yesterday, as the panelists
were talking, about right after the American Indian Policy Review
Commission Report in 1977, Congressman Lloyd Meads of the state of
Washington introduced legislation which would have restricted tribal
jurisdiction to trust land and tribal members. And that legislation was
not even seriously considered by Congress, not because Congress
thought that was already the law, but because Congress thought that that
was a stupid and ridiculous solution to the problem. In fact, in the
systematic terms I was talking about a few minutes ago it was not a
solution to the problem at all because it simply took a particular set of
legal issues and moved them from one place to the next, moved them
from the reservation borders to the edge of every piece of trust property.
It didn't really help anything. And it also did not solve the problem that
our distinguished panel has addressed in several ways this morning. And
that is, you can't draw a substantive line and say that certain kinds of
activities don't spill over. Water's not the only thing that's migratory.
And so the Congress, correctly understanding that this Lloyd Meads bill
was more petulance than it was policy, rejected it. Now what we're
getting is the Supreme Court under the guise of announcing congressional intent taking us from where the law was in 1977, precisely to where
Lloyd Meads wanted it to be and they claim to be a conservative court.
It's absolutely the most spectacular sleight of hand we're going to have
to add to that famous list of lies about "the check's in the mail" and
"I'm from the government, I'm here to help you," to the "I'm on the
United States Supreme Court and all I do is interpret congressional
intent." That's going to have to go to the top of the list.
I finally realized the proper way to characterize this. You've all
heard that old story about Michelangelo's dictum of sculptor, which is if
you're going to do a statue of a horse, you get a big block of marble
and you knock off anything that doesn't look like a horse. That's the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence. We had an idea of what we want an
Indian tribe to be so we'll take the law of 1977, just knock off
everything that doesn't look like what we want an Indian tribe to be.
And so I think that we've got to have a way to address this question of
Congress fixing this in a more systematic way. And I know it's not easy
to be optimistic about that because I have some misgivings about
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whether Congress is going to do that, but I do think we have to address
the question of who properly has the power in Indian affairs.
As I said yesterday, Congress has plenary power on the subject of
Indian affairs, which is different from power over Indians, although the
difference very often tends to disappear. When we started our activities
in state-tribal relations back in 1976 and right at a time when it was not a
popular thing to do, one of the things that we began to discover as we
looked at various intergovernmental relationships of Indian tribes was
that an ill-formed intergovernmental relationship was one where the tribe
and the surrounding governments argued about jurisdiction for its own
sake. Who has the power to do something? And it was tugging on the
cat. "No, I got the power." "No, I got the power." That's all they
cared about. And that's what they would litigate about. That's what
they would give press releases about. And it was jurisdiction for the sake
of jurisdiction. We want to do it because we want to do it. As we looked
at other kinds of relationships which at least in our scale of values, but I
think by some objective measurements, were more mature and
well-functioning relationships. We found that what they were arguing
about was standards and methods and procedures. They had decided, in
at least those areas of government, that power for its own sake was kind
of irrelevant. Let's talk about what we're going to do with the power
because we're both going to do the same thing with the power to govern
that maybe it doesn't matter who has the power. And that is an
important consideration and it's also, I think, something worth noting in
scholarship. As you do scholarship in the future, I suggest-I think it's
important to note that what the scholarship tends to be preoccupied with
is power for the sake of power. And that's appropriate. I'm not
suggesting that scholars should sit there and speculate about what the
Three Affiliated Tribes' mission control standards would be if they got
fully up and running. What I'm suggesting is that you note analytically
that you're talking about the consequences of power for the sake of
power and you're spinning that out and it may be that when the
governments sit down and actually talk to each other that they will find
that there's not really that much of a problem.
But just as we criticized our Utah brothers yesterday for what some
people thought was an excessive concern with avoiding tribal jurisdiction
when, in fact, they ended up winning in the tribal court and seemed to be
complaining because they had not gone to tribal court first. Now they
had an answer to that which may have persuaded some of us; may not.
But analytically, I think it's important to note how much time we spend
doing what I used to do when I was younger; and that is, talking about
how I didn't like brussel sprouts to the point where I was driving
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everybody nuts. If I'd just eat them and get it over with, it would be
done with. Now I don't have that problem because they're not
allowedgin the state. How much time has the federal government spent
looking at the prospect of tribal regulatory power sitting there on a plate
and saying, "ooh," when they don't know what the tribes would do with
that power. They have no idea how they'd exercise it. And I think by
getting drawn into that game, we tend to encourage that.
We could literally-I really think-I was kind of joking at firstmaybe we should include in the cost, the strategic cost, the cost of
conferences to talk about something. The Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention has some money to spend on juvenile justice.
And some of it goes to tribes according to a formula, flows through the
states according to a formula, and the way Congress made the formula a
couple years ago the tribal share nationwide was $77,000. I personally
went to about four meetings during the year to talk about how that
$77,000 should be spent. When you consider the cost of travel and per
diem, they had to have spent a half of a million dollars to talk about how
to spend that $77,000. How much time have we spent talking about what
tribes would do with power as a way of postponing finding out what
tribes would do with power in this regulatory area and in other areas? So
maybe it's time for the federal government to move from a preoccupation with jurisdiction for its own sake to worrying about standards, and
maybe we'd be a little bit better off.
How did we get in this position? The way we got in this position is
this: Tribes are a horizontal category that cuts across all vertical areas of
organization. In the federal government there's health, education,
welfare, agriculture, commerce, on and on and on. In that way of
organizing the world, Indians is not a category. Indians is not a category
in the same sense that agriculture is a category. And so when you think
of Indian affairs in the federal government, you think of Indian
agriculture, Indian commerce, Indian education, Indian this, Indian that.
It's horizontal. Same way with how tribes relate to state government, the
same way, and here's the point of how Indian affairs fit into the activities
of Congress because Congress legislates substantive categories the same
way the government is organized. When Dan Inoway took over the
Senate Select Committee about ten years ago or so, I wrote him a letter
and said, Please pay attention, do something that no previous committee
has done, and that is pay attention to trying to make sure that Indian
tribal considerations are included in general legislation because the
reason we're still screwing around with all this environmental stuff is
because back in the late '60s and early '70s people laughed when I said
these are important issues. You've got to include tribal government in
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this legislation. And it's over 20 years later and we're still talking about
it. Well, my letter to Dan Inoway was thrown in the trash. It did not get
to him. I don't see that the Select Committee even now has a systematic
approach to this, and everybody knows that there are joint referrals of
committees and if the Senate Select Committee tried to get joint referral
on every bill that had to do with Indians, there would not be Senate
Select Committee within about a week because they would gum up the
works. So there's got to be a more subtle and diplomatic way of getting
a piece of the action because that's the only way it's going to happen
because of this horizontal problem.
But I would also urge, in closing, for you to keep in mind the
distinction between a place at the table in the distribution of regulatory
power and a place at the table in terms of a share of benefits and
programatic participation. And in the category of benefits, remember
that there's two different issues, whether individual Indian people are
entitled to benefits as citizens and as people affected by the world, and as
opposed to the very different question of the role of the tribe as a
government in a delivery system being the ones to give them those
services. Very often we fail to make those distinctions and we end up
talking about an entire fruit salad and not just apples and oranges.
As a final, final thing, in terms of intergovernmental relations, the
things that have to be specified are basically the power to create
standards-in the regulatory area the power to create standards and the
power to enforce them of the actual enforcement, the adjudication and
the you're going to jail and the sit in that chair and strap yourself in,
whatever the enforcement is going to be. Other than those particular
inflexible constitutional requirements, everything else can be done
cooperatively. You can run the entire system cooperatively so you don't
have to buy two parts per million machines to measure things. You can
buy one parts per million machine, and if you don't trust each other,
you have a tribal guy sitting here reading the parts per million machine
and you have a state guy sitting there reading the parts per million
machine, but you don't have to duplicate it. And just as it's stupid to
talk about two economies, it's also stupid to talk about complete
duplication of governmental systems as a solution to these problems
because one thing I think we have to do again as commentators, if not
scholars, is recognize that we can't just dismiss the demographics as an
unworthy thing for the Supreme Court to be looking at. We tend to
think of tribes still according to the model of South Dakota and North
Dakota tribes and Navajo and the larger tribes in the southwest. There
are over 100 Indian tribes in the state of California. There are some
tribes with almost no reservation land to speak of that have tribal
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membership populations anywhere from 20,000 to 250,000. For us to
try to talk-to continue to promote or to analyze according to one
model when, in fact, that's not what the political impact is going to be is
very, very irresponsible on our part because we tend to lull tribal leaders
into thinking that one model fits all when it absolutely doesn't. We may
be paying the price for it at the wrong place in the process. Thank you.
MR. MONETTE: Does anyone on the panel have anything more
to add, say? Anybody out there have any questions?
FROM THE AUDIENCE: Yeah, I have a question and I think it
relates to what Mr. Grijalva was saying. I gave a workshop on Indian
issues to a bunch of EPA guys that were in charge of enforcing the
Clean Water Act in California. And there's one thing that troubled them,
and that was the nature of their trust responsibility towards either the
tribe or the individual Indians. You said in your speech that all agencies
have a trust responsibility toward the tribes. What their problem was is
that when they wanted to enforce the Clean Water Act on the reservation,
there are two dilemmas. One, they were being told Congress did not
delegate to them the role to being the trustee for either the tribe or the
individuals. The only general authority of trust responsibility was the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, not to the EPA. That was the first thing
that was bothering them. The second thing that was bothering them, if
they do have a trust responsibility under the EPA legislation, who does it
run to? The individuals or the tribe? And what happens when there's a
conflict between the two? And I would like to hear from anybody on
the panel if they have a position on this issue.
MR. GRIJALVA: Well, as Professor Royster implied earlier, I've
been an advocate a lot longer than I've been an academic, so I tend to
take an advocacy position which would favor my former client. I wrote
a lot of letters to EPA suggesting that they ought to consider my client's
situation, the interest of the tribe at stake, for example, in the cleanup of
a hazardous waste site, and that the trust obligation would require the site
manager, for example, a second-year graduate from some technical
college, to consider the impact of the potential remedy on my client's
fishing interest, or whatever interest. Depends on which region of EPA
you're in. I'm surprised in California that you got that response.
FROM THE AUDIENCE: Those people are activists and they
wanted to go out there and enforce not only the Clean Water but really
the RCRA. They had a lot of RCRA problems.
MR. GRIJALVA: You're talking enforcing against an Indian
individual or facility?
FROM THE AUDIENCE: No. I think what they were saying is that
there are a lot of things that they can just go out there and basically start
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advising tribes on how to devise codes to prevent pollution. And they
want to spend those resources because they said, we think this is part of
our trust responsibility or also telling them, look, those individuals,
they're polluting, they're not polluting, but they want to fight the
pollution. We want to enforce that. And they were basically told that
Congress has delegated to you that trust responsibility.
MR. MONETTE: Let me respond just for a second. Yesterday I
tried this little concept, I see that there is such a thing as a trust
relationship which is a political concept which really is what came out of
the Cherokee Nation cases because we weren't talking about allotments
and things like that. And there is a trust responsibility to an asset, a
property concept of a trust that arose with allotments. And when those
two things come into conflict because the tribe is in conflict with its own
citizen sometimes over one of its own citizen's property assets, I am of
the opinion at least, that the trust relationship, the political relationship
with the tribe, ought to prevail over this so-called, you know, property
trust responsibility to the asset, for one simple reason. If the individual is
not happy with what his tribe is doing, that individual can and should
utilize the tribe's Democratic participatory processes to change it.
That's the only way the tribes' governing processes get greased, get
worked, and will ever survive is if they are used. And I think that's
worth a little bit of-maybe even worth a little bit of environmental
degradation. Certainly maybe worth a little bit of infringement on what
some individual may see as a civil right. But a far greater civil right is
the ability to participate to change the way your government works on
you. And that's the reason I would do that.
MR. DELORIA: I agree with Professor Monette and I think that's a
really important distinction between the trust relationship and the trust
responsibility. Even if courts haven't fixed on that, it's an important
systematic distinction. My answer to your question, is that the Bureau
has certain obligations with respect to a particular piece of land. EPA,
according to the things I said yesterday, they have to fulfill their
statutory obligations in a way that's appropriate, that does not have a
deleterious effect on the Bureau's obligation to the Indians with respect
to that land. That's the measure of the trust responsibility of EPA as far
as I'm concerned. But EPA does not thereby get a share of the
Bureau's power. They just have to exercise their power with the
Bureau's responsibility-in line of what the Bureau's responsibilities are,
and that may be a limitation or that may affect what they do on the
reservation. But I think that there's been far too much loose talk about
trust responsibility in the same sense that there's been loose talk about
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conflict of interest to the point where a lot of sincere federal people
don't have the faintest idea where they stand anymore.
MR. MONETTE: Every little unhappy person on every reservation
is that little bud that's going to bloom into the next majority in the tribe.
You know, democracy at work. And if every time somebody's unhappy,
the federal government-and this is the same thing in states and their
citizens-if every time somebody's unhappy they're going to come
flying in to take care of the problem, those political processes never
learn to work. And that's one of the biggest problems that Indian tribes
are facing today in my opinion. Their processes never get to work. One
more question and then we're being called to lunch.
FROM THE AUDIENCE: Actually I don't have a question but I
have more of a comment, although I agree with your answer. The Tribe,
where I come from, we don't have a democratic process. We don't vote
in our leaders. It's through religious appointments in the system. So
although I do agree that the tribe is the trustee in terms of its population,
where I come from our people don't vote.
MR. DELORIA: But you have the power to change that, right?
FROM THE AUDIENCE: No.
MR. DELORIA: Read the Declaration of Independence. You have
the power to change that.
MR. MONETTE: Create your own Tribe's Declaration of
Independence. You probably could and it may be a long process. You
know, the states were not very good at dealing with slavery. They were
not very good at dealing with Indian tribes. Slavery may have lasted
another 400 years if it had not been for the Fourteenth Amendment. It
may have taken some time. A person can hardly stand here and say, "I
wish they would have let the state's democratic processes work with
slavery." But, on the other hand, you know, Democratic processes can
work. And I frankly would error on the side of time and deliberation.
MR. DUTHU: Mississippi ratified the Thirteenth Amendment just a
few weeks ago so it does work.
MR. MONETTE: It works. Thank you very much to the panelists.

